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Abstract This article examines the role social imaginations play in legitimizing
extrajudicial killings by death squads in the era of globalization. The role of popular
imagining has expanded into a widespread social practice as people increasingly
draw on images from all over the world via modern communication technologies.
Drawing on Mary Douglas’ concept ‘matter out of place’ and Nancy Scheper-
Hughes’ ‘symbolic apartheid’ we argue that to a certain extent, dehumanizing
imaginations about socially excluded groups legitimize death squad killings. The
article compares two case studies on death squads in the cities of Medellín,
Colombia and Davao City, Philippines. We conclude that social imaginations in the
era of globalization may be a driving force behind death squads in these and other
major cities in the world.
Introduction
In about 10 years, the general attitude towards street children and youth gangs has
changed dramatically in Davao City on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao.
Not a cause of great political concern in 1995, a decade later the city’s poor children
are being frowned upon as “undesirables” (Mondragon, cited in [48], see also Preda
Foundation Archives1 [44]). They risk becoming victims of the summary
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1PREDA is the acronym for the People’s Recovery, Empowerment Development Assistance Foundation.
The organization aims works to ‘win freedom and new life for children in jail, trafficked into brothels,
living on the street, for abandoned youth, and those mired in poverty (...) helping battered women,
indigenous people and protecting the environment’ (retrieved from the PREDA Web site, http://www.
preda.org/intro.htm on 22 May 2008). The NGO is located in Olangapo City, the Philippines and was
nominated for the Nobel Peace Price in 2001 and 2003.
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executioners city residents refer to in whispers as the DDS—Davao Death Squad.
According to a report of three Philippine NGOs [27: 13], the first DDS victim died
in 1993. However, DDS killings were sporadic at the time and street children were
not the usual targets. But starting in 1996, poor urban minors, some as young as
fourteen, appeared on the lists of DDS victims with increasing regularity [43].
Although the death squads were said to only kill “criminals”, child advocacy groups
emphasize there is no way to know for sure that the unfortunate DDS victims had
indeed committed any criminal act. They argue that poverty is the main reason
behind gang member vulnerability to this form of violence [41].
Social cleansing by mysterious death squads of perceived “scumbags”—with the
urban poor disproportionally represented in this imagined category—is not unique to
Davao City. About 10,000 miles away, across the Pacific Ocean, similarly frightened
residents of poor neighborhoods in Medellín in central Colombia recount how people
disappeared at the hands of right-wing paramilitaries. ‘It happens at night... They come
in a red car without a license plate. They choose a house, take the residents and
disappear in silence,’ said a resident of Comuna 13 in 2004. Sometimes victims of
paramilitary death squads were suspected of left-wing views, but they were often
innocent civilians, usually from the poorest areas, as several residents independently
confirmed (fieldwork notes Medellín 2004). The authorities seemed to be unable to
crack down on the heavily armed paramilitaries, who were sometimes presumed to
have the tacit support of the police. That was in 2004. Although the paramilitaries are
now engaged in a peace process and security in the city has improved, armed groups
that control the neighborhoods have not completely disappeared2.
Despite the historical and cultural distance between the two cities and the
10,722 miles separating them, there are certain similarities between the violent
histories of Davao City and Medellín, their death squads and the social imaginations
about them and their victims. Our comparative study is based in part on extensive
ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Medellín (2004 and 2006) by Rozema. The
fieldwork was part of a broader research project on the local Medellín peace
processes and included interviews with residents of violent neighborhoods, local
authorities and former paramilitaries. For safety reasons, it was impossible to move
freely in the violent neighborhoods. Respondents were selected via snowball
sampling, which was a safe way to come close to the armed groups. The
ethnographic fieldwork in Davao City (6 months in 1995 and a one-month follow-
up fieldtrip in 2005) by Oude Breuil originally focused on poor urban youths and
entailed participant observation, case studies of street gang members and unaffiliated
poor urban street children, and interviews with these children and youths, residents
of poor urban neighborhoods, social workers and politicians3. We have methodo-
logically enhanced and elaborated on the data from the two sites via systematic
literature and media analyses after the fieldwork periods, including studying
2 For more about the political situation in Colombia and the role of paramilitaries in Medellín, see [29, 30].
3 Oude Breuil conducted a twin study on gang boys and girls in 1995 in collaboration with Ruben Boers.
See Boers, J. L. R. (1999) Gevaarlijke jongens, Utrecht: Utrecht University (unpublished MA thesis);
Oude Breuil, B. C. (1997) Girls just wanna have fun. ‘Buntogs’ in Davao City, Philippines, Utrecht:
Utrecht University (unpublished MA thesis).
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scientific, policy and NGO reports and about eighty articles from local, regional and
national newspapers and bulletins as well as international newspapers.
The comparison of the two research locations was not the original aim of our
research. But once we had the two sets of findings side by side, we came across the
striking similarities this article addresses. So far, studies on death squads have shown
that global processes influence the practice and characteristics of paramilitary death
squads (e.g. [21]). In this article, we link this finding to theoretical insights into the
role and manifestations of social imaginations. We argue not only that the role and
effect of imaginations on the urban social landscape have changed as a result of
global developments, but that these imaginations are in turn globally reproduced. By
comparing Medellín and Davao City and analysing local and national ways of
viewing the urban social landscape and the “problem” of disorder via media analyses,
we make an effort to shed light on the mediascapes citizens draw their images from
about their social surroundings, or express some of their already existing images in.
Some local ideas on death squads and their victims reappear, as we will see, in other
parts of the world and suggest global patterns in social imaginations.
In this article we are not particularly interested in seemingly “objective”, nominal
data on death squads. We do not go into the figures on the casualties or the
perpetrators of these crimes or the amount of harm done to society. We doubt
whether this type of “hard” data is obtainable at all and if so, whether it would be as
objective as it might seem in the first instance. Even more importantly, several
studies (e.g. [6, 9, 15]) have shown that the amount of public interest in a social
problem (criminality, death squad killings etc.) is often not directly linked to its
objective dimensions. We prefer to focus on the images and meanings attributed to
death squads, how people make sense of their urban surroundings, and the role of
death squads there. Death squads legitimize their existence by referring to certain
public needs. As we demonstrate in this article, people’s meaning-making actions—
in particular their imaginations on how their lives could be more secure—are central
to our understanding of the death squads’ rationale.
Death squads in a global perspective
Paramilitary death squads can be found in a wide range of places and have a long
history. Various authors (e.g. [8, 34]) have enhanced our scientific understanding of
the phenomenon. But since the nature of the death squads themselves is ever
changing, mainly as a result of processes of globalization, so are the theories.
Campbell [8: 1] defines death squads as ‘clandestine organizations, often para-
military in nature, which carry out extrajudicial executions and other violent acts
(ranging from torture to bombing) against clearly defined individuals or groups of
people.’ Death squads may have (tacit) government support, but can also be
instigated and operate under the supervision of others, such as drug barons or
warlords. What death squads have in common is that they operate in areas with
government voids. Incomplete integration, as Durkheim [12, 13] argues, gives rise to
anomie, one result of which is excessive criminality. In this kind of situation, the law
is inadequate to regulate the interactions of various segments of society. The state
fails to provide security for its citizens and armed groups step into the power vacuum.
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The functions of the groups vary, Diehl [10] notes, according to the level of
political development. In European history, paramilitary groups in Weimar Germany
were closely connected to political parties and part and parcel of the national system:
they killed for political reasons, and not to meet the needs or wishes of organized
crime. At the other end of the spectrum, there are those Hobsbawn [20] calls
“bandits”who are primarily connected to the world of crime but are not altogether
“non-political” (ibid: 96). They constitute a nucleus of armed strength and are thus a
political force and a potential source of rebellion.
It is often difficult to prove whether the authorities support or authorize the
actions of paramilitary death squads in any way. Sometimes police officers work at a
desk in a police station in the daytime and operate covertly as members of death
squads at night, as has been the case in Brazil [28]. But this does not necessarily
mean they are operating with the consent of their superiors. Sometimes independent
paramilitary groups operate as death squads. In the event of political tension, some
governments support the efforts of death squads to eliminate political opponents or
supposed members of rebellious groups, as was the case during the dictatorships in
Guatemala and Peru [23: 33]. With or without government consent, paramilitary
groups in Latin America have eliminated leaders of trade unions and other social
organizations suspected of threatening the public order, thereby sometimes playing
into the hands of certain political goals. Anthropologist Michael Taussig [35: 1],
living in a village with paramilitaries in southern Colombia, finds paramilitaries an
elusive term for the very same reason of their obscure links to the government; they
are ‘soldiers who are not really soldiers but more like ghosts flitting between the
visible and invisible, between the regular army and the criminal underworld of
killers and torturers that all states seem to have no trouble recruiting when their
backs are up against the wall.’
Ironically, members of death squads are often motivated by a sense of social
responsibility [8: 7]. The key term is maintaining order, even if this means breaking
the law. Death squads murder abandoned street children, prostitutes or drug addicts
to socially “cleanse” society. They crack down on petty criminals to improve
security in the city and thus respond to citizen’s lack of faith in the formal
government. In this sense, death squads can be perceived as highly ideological; at
the same time, they instigate terror.
There has been a rapid increase in the number of death squads and other informal
armed groups since the Cold War, mainly as a result of globalization [21]. Free trade
agreements and the removal of trade barriers have led to the open markets informal
armed groups have benefited from. Since illegal arms traders can more easily operate
in the grey areas of the open market, arms are now widely available. The flourishing
illicit drug trade enables informal armed groups to finance their operations.
Globalization has made modern communication technology widely available, and
local armed groups operating as death squads use this technology in their networks
with similar armed groups or criminal gangs. In the case of Colombia local
paramilitary groups formed a strong national organization operating with advanced
communication techniques. Globalization processes have also changed the role of
the nation-state as the primary organizing principle. Post-modern nations are
increasingly confronted with individuals, capital, knowledge, technologies, media
and ideologies that cross national borders [2], and are thus losing control over what
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is happening in their own territory. The growing complexity of societies and
international treaties and regulations require ever more regulating power from the
state. Campbell [8: 16] notes that twentieth-century nation states ‘have increasingly
felt it necessary to reach outside themselves’ to live up to this demand. He sees the
trend towards “subcontracting” important political, social, and economic tasks that
formerly belonged to the state as a contemporary explanation for the state’s appeal to
death squads.
Although these ideas might explain why states share their theoretical monopoly
on violence with death squads, they do not address why the public condones their
existence. We address the role of death squads in everyday life from the angle of the
people’s social imaginations on the death squads and their victims.
People as “matter out of place”
In the late 1990s, various authors observe a new form of spatialized socio-economic
inequality on a global scale [5] as well as within cities [22, 39]. This spatial
inequality is attributed to globalization processes in general and socio-economic
polarization due to the negative impact of neoliberal economic ideology in particular
[5, 39]; this leads to a widespread sense of insecurity and pervasive images of
disorder, fragmentation and chaos [2] and consequently a strong emphasis on
security and maintaining law and order [17]. These developments have caused sharp
social dividing lines that are territorially reproduced, the authors argue, resulting in
the idea that people of a certain socio-economic standing “belong” in a certain part
of the city, where people of lower standing do not, and vice versa. Stereotyping and
stigmatization processes help define the categories of people and thus the morally
fixed territory or “proper place” where they belong.
Anthropologist Mary Douglas’ theoretical framework on the concept of dirt as
“matter out of place” [11] has, according to us, regained explanatory importance
here. In her classical work (1966), she demonstrates how all societies have ideas
about what is clean or pure and what is impure or dirty. Boundaries are central to
these notions and inanimate and human substances only become impure once they
pass a boundary, e.g. of the human body. Rituals linked to notions of purity and
danger and the boundaries between them govern and organize the social
environment; they help people create order in everyday chaos. We can stretch the
argument and suggest that death squads aim to create order in chaotic urban social
life by categorizing people as contributing, consuming, law-abiding, “normal” and
worthy citizens or as unworthy “rest” or “unwanted (...) human waste” [31: 353]. By
“removing” the latter category, the urban social order is maintained.
Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Daniel Hoffman [31] use this argument to explain the
murder of Brazilian street children by death squads. They hold that the discourse on
street children in Brazilian society facilitates the symbolic incarceration of poor
urban children in the impoverished favelas. By separating them from “civilized”
society—the authors aptly call this “symbolic apartheid” (ibid: 358)—citizens can
uphold an image of their cities as modern and orderly. Since any identification or
empathy with the outcasts is virtually impossible, in the long run symbolic
incarceration can even legitimize violence. Once people are reduced to “matter out
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of place”, it might be only logical and legitimate to “clean up the place”4. Jeffrey A.
Sluka [34] also hints at the link between imaginations and violence in his
introduction to the volume he edited on death squads: “misrepresentations” of
victims of torture, disappearances and murders precede actual (state) terror and these
representations are “a justification for killing them without even due process of law”
([34: 5], see also [40: 340]). Aretxaga [3: 46–70] similarly observes that state
officials produce “fantasies” about internal enemies to rationalize their own violence.
We wonder though whether “fantasy” is the right term for ideas and perceptions
that are so real to the people who hold them that they incite violence and even
murder. We prefer the term “imaginations”. Ordinary people, as Taylor [36: 23]
notes, “imagine” their social surroundings, and this is often not expressed in
theoretical terms but conveyed in images, stories and legends. Imaginations can be
shared by large groups of people. The social imagination is a common understanding
that paves the way for common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy.
We follow Arjun Appadurai [2] when he states that in contemporary global reality,
‘imagination is (...) central to all forms of agency, is itself a social fact and is the key
component of the new global order.’ In our own words, imaginations predefine how
people ultimately act on their felt needs. Imagined lives do not remain in people’s
minds as mere fantasies, they trigger action or (more or less conscious) non-action.
Imaginations create, sustain and redefine social order. Although Taylor emphasizes
the positive strength of people ‘who are meant to collaborate in peace to their mutual
benefits,’ we argue that imaginations may also lead to a further polarization of
society, which can ultimately end in violence.
Although imaginations are not new, their role has changed with contemporary
post-modern globalization. Four main changes in the act and context of imagining
have emerged in globalization studies. Firstly, as anthropologist Arjun Appadurai [2]
argues, imagination has increasingly become a social practice everyone engages in.
In pre-modern communities, imagination may have been limited to artists, priests
and visionaries, but the contemporary spread of media images and cultural values,
ideas and habits enable almost anyone to actively imagine new ways of life, new
kinds of friends, new rules and lifestyles.
Secondly, as a result of recent advances in transport and communication technology,
people can easily share their imaginations—or “scripts of imagined lives” as
Appadurai [2] calls them—with any number of people. This large-scale sharing of
social imaginations can give them extra meaning and impetus. Let us take a short
look at the role of rumors in this process. Dan E. Miller [25: 384] notes that rumors
are ‘situated social acts, involving the diffusion of information through informal
social relationships.’ They transform personal and interpersonal ideas, whether
imaginary or real, into widespread beliefs and allow for a shared orientation and
shared social action toward the object of the rumor [25: 383]. Rumors can thus be
4 This does not necessarily mean the targets of the squads are powerless victims or, to stretch the
argument, that the urban poor categorized as “unworthy” have no agency. Everyone is an agent in some
sense, although always limited in his or her choice of behavior by structural factors. Bauman [5] illustrates
in his book that the urban poor do resist ascribed labels and categories and rules that go with these
ascriptions. This article does not however focus on potential death squad victims’ strategies of resistance.
We would applaud further research on this topic.
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viewed as meaningful and purposeful social reactions to perceived dangers.
According to Miller, rumors appear in situations of insecurity and ambiguity and
help create order (ibid, 384). We might argue that rumors, urban legends and folk
stories may also serve as veiled language for those things that are too dangerous to
talk about, following a quote from Carolyn Nordstrom [26: 143]: ‘When the truth is
too dangerous to tell, people don’t stop talking. Instead, they shape truth into stories.’
With all the recent advances in communication technology, rumors can be assumed to
have a wider range and increased importance.
Thirdly, the nation states that used to control and govern people’s imaginations
are losing this power in today’s global era. The decline of their control over the
knowledge and actions of their citizens has been widely discussed (see e.g. [18]) and
need not be addressed here. What matters though is that other institutions, be they
formal or informal, national or transnational, provide products and services that
enable citizens to realize their imagined lives if the nation state is neither willing nor
able to do so. If imagined lives include perceptions on what one’s city should be
like, e.g. safe from “criminals” and “subversives” and free of “human waste”, it is
easy to see how death squads may come into the picture.
Lastly, nowadays we have the conditions as well as the technology to increasingly
realize our imaginations, or have them realized for that matter by non- or extra-
governmental agencies without taking the needs of others into account. We have
already referred to communication technologies such as the Internet, which make it
easy to anonymously buy and sell goods or services we need or think we need, either
legally or illegally. Porous national borders, the mobility of people and capital and
the trend towards subcontracting make it ever harder to trace back the responsibility
for whatever harm is done. In other words, the contemporary world allows
individuals, groups and organizations to realize the imaginations of some and be
careless about the needs of others (see also [5: 8]).
We argue that these changes in imaginations and the ways to realize them impact the
activities of death squads and the social legitimizing of these activities. Imaginations
about what society should be like, about the individuals and groups willing to put these
social imaginations into effect, and about the rightful place of the “marginal other” in
society are not limited to any specific locality. By comparing the social imaginations on
death squads in Davao City in the Philippines andMedellín in Colombia, we argue that
the social imaginations in the two cases bear striking similarities. Certain aspects of
these imaginations might even be drawn from what Tharoor [37] calls “global
imaginations”. Contemporary changes in the acts and conditions of imagining affect
the discourse on death squads in these localities as well as the ensuing social acts.
Medellín
Advent and decline of death squads in Medellín
The Colombian city of Medellín, with around two million inhabitants, has expanded
rapidly in recent decades. Modern office buildings and shopping malls in the city
centre are in sharp contrast with the poor areas in the surrounding hills. A modern and
fast metropolitan train and cable car connect the two worlds. In the 1960s and 1970s,
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Medellín was known as a prosperous industrial city, pleasantly located in the green
hills and with a low crime rate. The tranquil atmosphere of the city changed in the
1980s with the advent of the Medellín drug cartel that employed hundreds of hired
killers, sicarios, who operated as the first large-scale death squad in the city. The
drug cartel is history, but new informal armed groups later started to operate as death
squads, including left-wing militias, informal vigilante groups involved in social
cleansing, guerrilla movements and paramilitaries with alleged government support.
In 1991, the heyday of the drug cartel, the homicide rate peaked at 381 homicides
per 100,000 inhabitants. This figure had dropped by 2005 but was still 37 [1].
All the armed groups in Medellín operate within the context of the national
conflict in Colombia. The main national actors, the guerrilla and paramilitaries, both
invaded the poor areas of Medellín. The guerrilla movements FARC (originally a
farmers’ movement) and ELN (Cuba-oriented) strive for a socialist state. The
paramilitary organization AUC, a national umbrella of local paramilitary groups, was
established to fight the guerrilla and in its own words, to restore order because the
national army was unable to do so. The paramilitaries, however, are held responsible
for bloody massacres as they not only killed presumed guerrilla fighters, but also
residents of areas with a guerrilla presence. In 2003 the paramilitaries began to
engage in a peace process with the government. Nationwide more than 30,000
paramilitaries have now laid down their weapons. Since there are only limited
resources to accompany their reintegration into society, their future is however
uncertain. So far, a small segment of these former paramilitaries have formed new
criminal organizations.
Medellín, already in the grip of various armed groups, entered a new stage in the
1990s when the guerrilla decided to expand the struggle from the countryside to the
city and the paramilitaries followed suit. For years, urban warfare ravaged the poor
neighborhoods of Medellín. When the guerrilla was finally expelled, the para-
militaries established their own regime in most of the city’s poorer areas. From then
on, paramilitary death squads went into operation. Marcia Romero, who lives in the
Comuna 13, recalls how the paramilitaries created a state of fear among the
residents. ‘The paramilitaries had people disappear in the night, you never knew
when they would come again or if you would be the next victim tonight. We lived in
fear all the time.’ Most surprisingly, the disappearances occurred within a fifteen-
minute distance from the city centre. The municipal authorities did not take any steps
to improve the situation in the poor, violence-ridden areas. This situation came to an
end in 2004 with the first demobilization process of the paramilitaries and a new city
government, which allocated a substantial part of its budget to the development of
the poor neighborhoods [4, 16, 29, 30].
Imagination through the media
The image of the death squads in Medellín is complex, with various intertwining
groups. At times they cooperated, like the paramilitaries and drug gangs, and
sometimes even separate factions within the paramilitaries fought. Sometimes the
groups operated in a hierarchic way, e.g. with the paramilitaries giving orders to youth
gangs. It was often impossible for the residents and local authorities to determine who
was operating in the name of which group. ‘Small groups of masked men patrolled the
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streets, but we didn’t knowwhether they were paramilitaries, members of a youth gang
or possibly the police,’ comments a resident of Comuna 13.
The paramilitaries featured most prominently in the media accounts. The media
portrayed them in contradictory ways: as heroes of the urban war, perpetrators of
human rights violations, drug traffickers and shrewd negotiators with the
government. Imaginations about the paramilitary death squads were sometimes
invoked by descriptions of their leaders who were well known to the public. In
Medellín Don Berna or Adolfo Paz, officially Diego Fernando Murillo Bejerano,
was the leader of the main group Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN). He was
nicknamed Adolfo Paz (Adolfo Peace) because he helped settle conflicts in several
neighborhoods in Medellín, thus saving many lives.
But the media also portrayed his other sides. As one of Los Pepes, the group that
challenged Pablo Escobar’s drug cartel, he became one of Colombia’s major drug
traffickers. He also led a vast criminal organization in Medellín known as La Oficina
(The Office), which employed hired killers to work on commission for whoever
wanted to pay. For years La Oficina was no more than an urban legend known to
everyone in Medellín, and only recently did the media reveal some of the details
about it. The weekly Semana [47] compared La Oficina to Pablo Escobar’s former
network of hired killers, but with more sophisticated technology and tentacles in
various branches of business. At the same time Don Berna, the leader of the
paramilitary group BCN, presented himself as a man of vision who wanted an
orderly and safe city. In an unexpected move, Don Berna agreed that the more than
800 paramilitaries under his command would be the first to enter a demobilization
process, thus reinforcing his image as a peacemaker.
Contrasting imaginations of this kind continue to live on about the paramilitaries
in the city and their leader Don Berna, the hero and scoundrel. During a visit to
Comuna 13, a demobilized combatant showed off one of his new peaceful projects, a
small zoo for the children of his community. Its name, Zoo Don Berna, was on his T-
shirt. ‘He is the man who defeated the guerrilla, he should be remembered as a hero
forever,’ he said. On that day Don Berna was already for some time in prison. In
2008 he was extradited to the United States on charges of drugs trafficking. Media
reports link the discovery of mass graves directly to Don Berna [46, 49]. Since the
discovery of the mass graves, the media have devoted more attention to the victims,
who they were and why they were killed. In the past the media focus was on who the
paramilitary perpetrators were and the backgrounds of the victims were virtually
ignored.
Although the media openly reported on the paramilitary death squad activities
and, if known, mentioned the perpetrators responsible for the disappearances, they
did not tell the whole story. The presumed relations between the authorities and the
underworld were a well-guarded secret. Paramilitary actions were conducted from
within the institutions in the city centre, as a key respondent said on condition of
anonymity. It is suggested that various members of the City Council (not the
municipal government) and industrialists played a leading role in the paramilitary
death squads. The earlier mentioned oficinas played a key role. Persistent rumors
about these secret criminal organizations contributed to a preliminary understanding




The presence of paramilitary death squads created a permanent state of fear among
the residents of the poor neighborhoods. They viewed the paramilitaries as
oppressors who deliberately killed people while they themselves got rich from the
trade in cocaine. However, teenagers without any prospects of a good job or
education joined the ranks of the paramilitaries in the hope of a career there.
The elite visions about the death squads have changed. To the elite, the poor
neighborhoods in the hills were like an alien planet to be avoided. More and more
wealthy residents of Medellín chose to live in gated communities with enhanced
security. They initially had a positive view of the paramilitaries, since they
maintained some kind of order. As long as the killings did not happen in their
own world, the sizable numbers of victims did not bother the elite so much. But as
the paramilitaries’ killings and disappearances in Medellín became more widely
known, the elite’s imaginations about them turned negative. This change coincided
more or less with the start of the new city government in 2004 and its wish to
develop the poor neighborhoods.
As the elite’s imaginations about the perpetrators changed, so did their views on
the victims. All the victims were initially anonymous and viewed as problem-
makers, but now the elite was more aware of how many of the victims were innocent
civilians. Some members of the elite participated in projects for street children who
were once death squad targets.
The elite is also concerned about the image of Medellín as one of the most violent
cities in the world and the financial consequences. In response to this negative
picture, industrial companies tried to be positive in their advertisements to neutralize
the uncertainty about the future or, in the words of Villa Martínez [38: 183], create a
comunidad imaginada—an imagined community. In fact the industrial elite
expressed a wish to transform the fragmented urban space into a more united city
and increase its social cohesion. In another effort to leave the era of violence behind,
the telecom company Orbitel advertised with the slogan, ‘No more minutes of
silence. Speak. Colombia will be what you want it to be’ (‘No más minutos de
silencio. Hable. Así Colombia será como usted quiere que sea,’ in Villa Martínez
[38: 183]. Initiatives like this have contributed to a dialogue on violence in urban
society, but the distance between the elite and the urban poor remains. The elite
image of the poor as “unwanted citizens” has not changed that much.
Davao City
Davao City’s violent history
As in Medellín, the death squad activities were not Davao City’s first experience
with extrajudicial killings and bloodshed. Davao City, with 1,400,000 inhabitants5,
5 Retrieved from The Official Web Site of Davao City, http://www.davaocity.gov.ph/about/business-
leisure.htm on 10 May 2007.
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had a strong tradition of paramilitary mobilization, counter-insurgency, vigilante
groups and extrajudicial killings by death squads ([19: 129, 27: 11]). On the southern
island of Mindanao, Davao City witnessed violent clashes between Muslim
separatist rebels and the Philippine armed forces starting in the 1970s [24]. Its
residents witnessed these clashes first hand in 1993 when Muslim rebels attacked the
San Pedro Cathedral with three grenades in the middle of evening Mass (fieldwork
notes 1995, [50]).
According to Pilgrim Guasa, a local NGO program officer, the people of Davao City
are “desensitized” to violence by its ‘history of being used as a laboratory for violence’
(cited in [41]). She is probably referring to the fierce insurgency and counter-
insurgency struggles of the 1970s and 1980s, during the authoritarian regime of
Ferdinand E. Marcos6. His battle against the political opposition, especially the
Communist Party of the Philippines and its New People’s Army (CCP/NPA), included
mass arrests, disappearances and extra-judicial or summary killings [19: 126].
The NPA guerilla units had a stronghold in Davao City. Their Sparrow Units
eliminated anyone who committed “crimes against the people”—abusive policemen,
militaries and common criminals [27: 13]. When these units, however, turned on
civilians with their terror tactics, the anti-communist counter-insurgency movement
Alsa Masa emerged, armed in part by the military [19: 138, 50]. Alsa Masa’s terror
strategies included intense intimidation and extreme violence, such as dismember-
ment and beheading. Agdao, one of the poorest quarters in Davao City and the
centre of this battleground, was known at the time as “Nicaragdao” (fieldwork notes
1995, see also [41, 50]).
Davao City was thus a theater of violence for decades. The authoritarian, iron-fist
regime of Marcos was eventually ousted, but the subsequent four presidents did not
fully succeed in ending human rights violations by communist insurgency groups,
nor could they end the kidnappings, torture and killings by Muslim militants such as
the Abu Sayyaf Group [7]. It might come as no surprise that Davaoeños welcomed
Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte, who promised to fight crime and restore order, in 1987
and re-elected him in 1992, 1995 and 2001. Duterte succeeded in reducing Davao’s
per capita crime rate to the nation’s lowest [50] and on its official website, the
formerly notorious Philippine murder capital now boasts of being ‘the most peaceful
city in Southeast Asia.’
DDS and Dirty Harry: imaginations of the safe and orderly
There is, however, a stain on Davao City’s shiny reputation: an urban legend [42] or
public secret that human rights advocates have struggled to bring out into the open.
The Davao Death Squad (DDS), appearing for the first time in 1993, rid the city of
suspected drug pushers and petty criminals by extrajudicially killing them. It is hard
to get adequate and valid information, since none of the killers have ever been
apprehended and witnesses do not dare to come forward. However, the following
6 Pilgrim might also be referring to the view expressed in Hedman [19:126] that the Alsa Masa strategies
of armed neighborhood patrolling were supposed to be an experiment adopting the ‘low-intensity-conflict’
doctrine of the Reagan era.
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picture emerges from newspaper articles [41, 43, 48, 50] and a report written by
local NGOs [27].
The DDS killings are carried out on the streets, often in the daytime. Two men on
motorcycles appear, wearing black or military clothing [27]. While one of them
serves as look-out, the other shoots the victim from nearby. The victims are often
warned several days or weeks beforehand and told to stop their criminal activities ‘or
else they’ll be dead’ [41]. The identity of the DDS members and their possible link
to legal institutions can only be surmised or imagined. Most press reports agree that
the killers must be “professionals”. They doubt the official assumption of the mayor
and former director of the Philippine National Police that the killers are gang
members [50], since they hold that gang killings are less organized and use different
weapons7. The level of organization and use of professional arms suggest, according
to some observers, that the killers are former NPA rebels; their strategies resemble
the urban warfare tactics of the Sparrow Units in the 1980s [27: 13, 41]. Other
rumors identify them as officers or ex-officers of the Philippine National Police8 and
militaries [27, 41], members of criminal syndicates [41], contract killers [41, 45] or
ordinary citizens who take the law into their own hands [42]. Notwithstanding this
confusing summary, the main line in the press reports as well as the allegations of
local NGOs and human rights organizations is that since the perpetrators continue
with impunity for so many years, there must have been some link between the DDS
and the local or national government.
The allegations of mayor Duterte’s direct or indirect involvement is part of a more
encompassing urban legend about his persona, blending ambiguous admiration and
fear into a heroic image of the “Dirty Harry of the Philippines” (fieldwork notes
1995 and 2005, see also [43, 48]. Other nicknames are just as colorful, such as “the
Terminator” [43] or the Punisher [50]. In addition to the nicknames, several heroic
and tough stories live on in the collective imagination. One story goes that in his
early days in office (1980s), the mayor went to an NPA rebel camp in the Davao
City hinterlands. He said he understood their cause, but told them to stay out of ‘his
city’ (fieldwork notes 1995, [50]). His tough one-liners in interviews with the press
add to the mayor’s Dirty Harry image: ‘If I win [the mayoral elections], more
criminals will be killed because I have vowed to protect the people of this city’ [43],
‘criminals and rebels do not have a monopoly on evil’ [50] and ‘if I’m going out,
I’m going out with my guns blazing’ [50].
The nicknames, legendary stories and self-projected image of a mayor with a non-
compromising attitude on crime all add to the rumor that he is directly involved in
the DDS summary killings, telling “his men” whom to kill. The people of Davao
City thus sometimes equated the DDS with the Duterte Death Squad (fieldwork
7 Gang members often use indian panas, which are home-made catapult-like weapons that shoot rusty,
pointed nails into the victim’s body at close range (fieldwork notes 1995, see also Boers 1999, see note 3).
8 In 2001, witnesses linked three police officers to the DDS because they were often near the execution
scene. However, since no official testimony or complaint was filed, there was no official action. In 2005
the local newspaper Sunstar Davao reported that a confessed member of the Davao Death Squad was
apprehended and charged with extortion. Although the report did not reveal the background of the
perpetrator, it did mention that his companion was a police officer First Class. The Commission on Human
Rights in the Philippines stated that the Philippine National Police is the worst abuser of human rights (in
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2004).
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notes 2005, [50]) and various national as well as international sources linked the
DDS to the mayor9. So far, however, there has not been any unequivocal evidence to
confirm the rumors. There was a significant drop in summary executions in 2000,
when Duterte stepped down as mayor of Davao City. This drop, however, could well
have been a consequence of the fierce Internet and media campaign by the Preda
Foundation at the time against the summary killings. The casualty figures rose again
dramatically when Duterte won the mayoralty elections in 2001 [27: 12].
It is not our aim here to determine whether or not the rumors and allegations are
true. The point is that the mayor’s supposed involvement in the DDS is part of the
collective imaginations about a heroic man who is not afraid to get his hands dirty to
protect the city. These imaginations have helped certain segments of the Davao City
population deal with everyday insecurities and the city’s violent history. So it is not
surprising from this angle that many Davaoeños are not too concerned about the
extrajudicial killings in the streets. Some of them openly applaud the killings, which
they say have made their city a lot safer and more attractive to foreign investors
(fieldwork notes 2005). Duterte’s third re-election as mayor in 2001, reinstalling his
ten-year rule of Davao City, shows that most of the people of Davao City accept the
mayor’s self-proclaimed tough attitude on crime and apparent lack of concern about
the DDS killings. As he stated in an interview, ‘I am not at all interested in the
killings of criminals, especially of people involved in drugs’ [48].
This tolerance on the part of many Davaoeños has to do with the violent history
of Davao City and its social imagination of a besieged city, with the urban poor
considered dangerous “folk devils”, to use Stanly Cohen’s [9] famous terminology.
To better understand this feeling, we need to also consider the imaginations about the
victims of the DDS as well.
‘We want society to be cleansed of its scum’
From our media-analysis we can conclude that the victims of DDS killings are
generally felt to have been drug dealers, thieves or gang members. Especially in the
short news items, the identity of the victims is generally accompanied by a remark
like ‘the local police has stated that the victim is a suspected drug pusher’ (or some
other reference to alleged criminal activities). Some victims are described as ex-
convicts shot several days after their release from prison.
However, in-depth articles mainly written by foreign journalists [43, 48, 50] allow
representatives of NGOs or child or human rights advocacy groups to voice an
alternative view in which the DDS targets are not all adults, nor are they all
criminals. An in-depth article published by the Philippine Centre for Investigative
Journalism refers to the death of several minors at the hands of the DDS and to urban
poverty as the underlying cause of what happens on the streets [41]. NGOs in Davao
City also conclude from their statistics that at least 16% of the victims in 2001/2002
were minors [27: 12]; in 2005, 30% of the 200 victims are thought to have been
children (Rogers, cited in [45]. Other in-depth articles and NGO and human rights
organization reports state that it is not always certain that DDS victims were ever
9 See for example the Dow Jones Reuters report of 27 May 2002.
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involved in criminal activities [27: 13]; some were simply cases of “mistaken
identity” [45].
These alternative imaginations draw a picture of the DDS not targeting criminals,
but mainly the urban poor, in particular boys and young men. This picture is similar
to the one Scheper-Hughes and Hoffman drew in their article on Brazilian street
children [31: 353], stating that they were perceived as ‘a blemish on the urban
landscape and a reminder that all is not well’ in Brazilian society. Scheper-Hughes
and Hoffman attribute the fierce social exclusion of these children to the fact that
they are visible proof of the Brazilian socio-economic crisis and belie the preferred
collective imaginations about Brazil as a modern and prosperous nation-state. The
same may hold true for Davao City. According to the coordinator of a consortium of
child advocacy groups, the DDS killings are ‘a systematic, dramatic effort to
eliminate the undesirables in society’ (in [48]).
The elimination of unwanted “elements” is euphemistically considered a clean-
up, or a “process of expurgation”, as a local tourist officer called it [48]. According
to the president of the Chamber of Commerce, the process was good for business in
Davao City, since ‘we want society to be cleansed of its scum’ [43]. The imagination
about the victims as “matter out of place” is illustrated by his comment that ‘these
people are garbage and, just like any garbage, you have to dispose of them’ [43].
This image of the urban poor as disposable combines with the public awareness of
Davao City’s violent history and the unrest in the hinterlands to create a picture of Davao
City as calm and orderly now, but potentially violent and chaotic tomorrow. In a strongly
socio-economically divided Philippine society, the urban poor are easily targeted as folk
devils and considered disorderly, dirty and criminal. The collective imagination of the
DDS killings reverberates around the idea—often confirmed by local media reports—
that only criminals are killed and that it makes the city a lot safer. By imagining the DDS
and the mayor as keepers of order, the public clings to a discourse that reduces everyday
urban insecurities: there is danger, but at least it is being dealt with.
Medellín and Davao City compared: making sense of urban fears
“Contemporary fears, the typically ”urban fears’, unlike those fears which led
once to the construction of cities, focus on the ‘enemy inside’. (...) The walls
built once around the city now criss-cross the city itself, and in a multitude of
directions.”
(Zygmunt Bauman [5: 47–48])
The urban landscapes of Medellín and Davao City have an important aspect in
common: they live up to the image of contemporary segregated cities so vividly
described by [5, 32] and others, who hold that the fragmentation of city space is the
result of a growing gap between the rich and the poor. City space is increasingly
privatized and people who can afford to, buy space where they can live, work and spend
their leisure time, excluding the urban poor with fences, “no trespassing” signs and
armed security guards. In Medellín the city elites withdraw into gated communities, and
in Davao City the poor urban areas are considered dark, disease-ridden places better
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avoided by “decent” people (fieldwork notes 1995). The poor urban districts in both
cities are physically nearby, but mentally very distant “Third Worlds”.
In line with the ideas of Bauman [5] and Sennett [32, 33], Scheper-Hughes and
Hoffman [31: 360] argue that struggles like this are not really about urban space,
they are about class differences. ‘The real issue,’ they note when discussing
unwanted Brazilian street children, ‘is the preoccupation of one segment of Brazilian
society (the middle class) with the “proper place” of another and poorer class of
children.’ Class-based battles like this are about power—the power to define and
enforce what the city should be like and what role each citizen should play. So it is
not surprising that in Medellín as well as Davao City, industrialists and businessmen
should be the first to express an acceptance of the death squad killings, or at any rate
fervently back the idea of a calm and orderly city. They are, after all, the ones with
the most to lose from petty crime and a lack of safety, as their trade and industry
would suffer most from a negative and violent image.
But it is not only industrialists and businessmen who imagine the city under a
siege of disorder. We would like to add to the efforts of Scheper-Hughes and
Hoffman to present imaginations like this as aspects of a class struggle the notion
they may also cut across social classes. The urban poor live in some of the most
impoverished parts of the city and experience limited government interest in their
neighborhoods, dilapidation of the built environment and social marginalization on a
daily basis. They too might well initially welcome the death squads as a power that
could keep slum life from getting any worse. The imaginations of the two classes
may thus converge, even though the underlying experiences and ambitions differ.
In Davao City as well as Medellín, local leaders are very partial to perceptions of
their city as dirty and disorderly. Their popularity largely derives from their
positioning themselves as the ones who will clean up the mess and make the city
safer. The nicknames of the Davao City mayor, the Punisher and Dirty Harry, mainly
reflect social imaginations about him as the person appointed to deal with
“criminals”, but paramilitary leader Don Berna’s image as a peacemaker is more
implicit. Rather than triggering associations with the “enemies within”, it focuses on
the city’s ambitions for the future. Although this image may seem more democratic
and friendly, both versions have helped legitimize the violent death squad activities
by supporting the idea that cleaning the human waste off the city streets is a
legitimate thing to do. Underlying the tolerance towards death squad violence, there
is thus the dream of a city of peace and quiet (see also [5: 97]), a felt need for order.
This need is felt by rich and poor alike, the poor long for order in the impoverished,
insecure, marginalized daily life in the slums, and the rich yearn to join in the march
of progress and ultimately rid the city of its Third World image. In the ideal elite
version, the urban poor are “matter out of place”, embodying poverty where there
could be prosperity and representing abjection [14] where elites long for progress.
It is not surprising that the dream of order is so important in these cities. Davao
City and Medellín have both had a history of violence that may explain why people
there believe they are in constant peril. Global developments have probably
influenced people’s “imagined worlds” which, according to Appadurai [2], are
increasingly fragmented and chaotic. Like urban legends or rumors, imaginations of
a utopian city, of heroic leaders making a clean sweep and of death squads acting as
janitors are creative efforts to elevate everyday urban insecurities to a safer level of
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urban life. The question that remains is whether any imagination can be collectively
shared and can serve to legitimize death squads. Or is there a special pattern to be
discerned in the two cases under study?
Who defines the utopian city? Global imaginations and their impact
In our theoretical section, we note four main changes in the nature of imaginations in
the contemporary interconnected world. Firstly, the act of imagining scripts of
alternative lives has become a practice everyone engages in, now that communica-
tion technologies help show people other ways of life and stimulate the imagination.
In our case studies, communication technology has indeed been an important
stimulus to people’s imaginations and to their expressing their dissatisfaction with
their lives. In Medellín and Davao City, imaginations about death squads as keepers
of order and about their victims as “garbage”, are presented in the mass media,
ranging from television, newspapers to the Internet. They vary from commentaries,
mainly by the elite, to interviews with residents of rich and poor neighborhoods
alike. In Medellín even illegal armed groups, including local branches of the
paramilitaries, have their own web sites where they present themselves and their
ideas about the future of the city. In principle, it seems as if everyone can take part in
the collective imagination of what the city is and should be.
However, in the overall picture, the imaginations of some groups are more widely
represented in the media than those of others. Local neighborhood organizations in
marginal sections of the city have less access to the traditional media, whereas
leaders of industry can easily present their ideas on television and in the newspapers
or via paid advertisements. So even though everyone can take part in imagining ideal
lives nowadays, some people’s ideas are more hegemonic than others, reach further
and exert more influence on collective imaginations and the ensuing action (or lack
of action). This not only holds true for Davao City and Medellín at a local level, a
similar mechanism can be discerned in the world at large, where the sharing of
imaginations is subject to power hierarchies.
We are thus already focusing on the second aspect of contemporary imaginations, the
larger scale they are now shared on. This sharing of information can serve as a source of
power for formerly peripheral groups. Even in poor areas in Medellín, people have
access to the Internet at the offices of local neighborhood committees and are able to
share information with others. As regards imaginations in marginal neighborhoods
about death squads and their victims, the message is often spread through rumors that
are rapidly spread using new technologies, including the Internet and rapid public
transport. We can thus confirm the notion that imaginations are shared more easily.
It should be noted though that the residents of Medellín and Davao City do not all
share the same imaginations and if they do, their imaginations may not be based on
similar experiences, cityscapes or ambitions. The elites picture the urban poor as the
ultimate “other” and death squads as an effective way to deal with them, whereas
most of the urban poor mainly view the death squads as another urban insecurity and
a daily threat. The urban poor who initially see the death squads in a positive light do
so in the hope that they can fill the void the city authorities left when they
abandoned the poorest districts to fend for themselves. So even if the imagination of
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an orderly city may be widely shared in the first instance by various social classes
bonded by life in the same city, as soon as we scratch the surface of this imagination
we see a different picture. The all-encompassing imagination of order conceals any
number of realities, appreciations and ambitions related to city life. These realities
are shared within groups that inhabit similar socio-economic spaces, not between
them. We can see this more clearly if we expand our view to include both of the
research sites. The imaginations of the elites in Davao City and Medellín bear a
striking resemblance, since they both imagine their cities as “the place to be”—that
is: for a selected group of people. Death squad victims are imagined as “out of
place”, morally inferior, and thus too different to have any sympathy with.
We might want to add a hierarchic, layered notion to the observation that
imaginations are more extensively shared in the global era. As cities are fragmented
and divided by criss-crossing internal walls, so are people’s imaginations. The
similarities between our two cases suggest certain globally reproduced imaginations,
e.g. the urban poor as “human garbage”, heroic leaders named after “global” movie
and television stars, cities under siege and death squads as moral janitors, but not in
the sense that they are universally shared, melting groups together harmoniously in a
certain physical space. Instead of considering imaginations to be nationally
anchored, as in the imagined communities of founding father Benedict Anderson,
or city-based for that matter, we suggest focusing more on collective imaginations
that are transnationally shared by a group of people in a similar socio-economic
position with the everyday life experiences that come with that position. We are not
suggesting a revival of the Marxist notion of a transnational proletariat, since this
kind of fixed notion of class does not respond to contemporary social status
insecurities. We would suggest transnational “groups” sharing similar imaginations
simply because they experience similar life conditions and are ascribed similar
“proper places” by others. This may have to do with their socio-economic class, age,
skin color, ethnicity or subculture, or even their degree of resemblance to particular,
mediatized “scumbag” images.
By devoting attention this way to the similar life experiences of people in
comparable positions in the global social hierarchy, we can better understand why
some imaginations, such as Dirty Harry as a noble fighter, reproduce themselves in
contexts that in the first instance seem so utterly different. What do “global images”
of this kind tell us about the hierarchic social position of individuals who support
notions like these? What do they tell us about their ideas on how to cope with
imagined “others”? In short, what do globally reproduced notions on deviance and
how to deal with it say about power relations between different groups? And who do
these groups consist of? These are pressing questions to address in future research.
In our theoretical section, we also note the contemporary failing of nation-states
to control their collective imaginations. There is evidence in our two case studies to
confirm as well as refute this idea. Paramilitary groups in Medellín and death squads
in Davao City and the business elites in both these cities did undermine the local
government control over the people’s imaginations. In Medellín, the paramilitaries
cruised the poor neighborhoods in their expensive luxury cars and motorcycles,
which were powerful symbols, augmenting the popular belief that the paramilitaries
and not the local government were the only ones with the power to bring about their
ideal and imagined cities. At the same time, however, the local authorities in turn
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would augment the existing imaginations and make them more alive and powerful,
or maybe even create or co-create them for their own goals, as in Davao City. It thus
seems too simple to conclude that the nation-state, or its local representatives play
only a marginal role in public imaginations. Indeed, they seem to play an intricate
role in the imaginations, using them as they see fit.
Several concluding remarks should be made about the fourth change in
imaginations, the increasing opportunity to bring about what we imagine and get
away with whatever negative consequences might ensue. Ever more complex
liaisons between power groups make the setting for death squad killings vague and
non-transparent. This is clear in Medellín and Davao City, where one can only guess
who is really involved in the summary executions. In theory, people’s imaginations,
the stories they tell and the quickly spreading rumours should establish some manner
of order in this daily jumble. However, our case study leads us to conclude that
imaginations about death squads and their activities, leaders and victims only add to
the daily urban confusion. It is difficult and unsafe for people to unravel the
information on the death squads, which is spread by groups that each have their own
goals and ambitions. What is more, their imaginations do not have full insight into
the power struggles at hand or the motives of various of the parties. In fact, public
imaginations on the death squads often increase rather than reduce daily urban
insecurities. As the most hegemonic imaginations on the death squads in our case
studies attribute them with the role of janitor, quite a heroic role keeping the city safe
and orderly, the daily lives of most of the people only become more insecure.
To sum up, to a certain extent the dehumanizing imaginations about socially
excluded groups legitimate the killings by death squads. Imaginations of this kind
play an increasing role as more and more people draw on images from all over the
world. Popular and elite conceptions of death squads and their victims are then
constructed through complex interactions between locality-based groups, global
communications and mass media.
In a way, the public imaginations in Medellín and Davao City protect the
perpetrators of these killings. They serve as building blocks for the utopian city of
some citizens and destroy the imagined, safe city of others. Some of these others are
driven out of the imagined moral order and, as the death squads practise what the
moralists preach, eliminated from the physical realm as well. In this way,
imaginations about death squads as the rightful parties to clean up human waste
may indeed become fatal imaginations.
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